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THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING VOTES:
LESSONS FROM THE JENNINGS V. BUCHANAN
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION CONTEST
Jessica Ring Amunson & Sam Hirsch*

The November 2006 congressional balloting in Florida's Thirteenth District was
a model for how not to conduct an election. The final margin was less than 400 votes
out of nearly a quarter million total ballots cast.' But the candidate who officially
"lost" came up short only because 18,000 congressional ballots cast on paperless electronic touchscreen voting machines in her home county turned up blank.2 The ensuing
litigation, both in state court and in the U.S. House of Representatives, demonstrated
that about 14,000 of those 18,000 Sarasota County congressional "undervotes"-.
ballots with no vote for either congressional candidate-were likely unintentional,
and that had those ballots been counted as they had been intended, the candidate who
3
officially lost by nearly 400 votes would instead have triumphed by about 3,000.
That is no way to run an election.
This Article, however, focuses not on the substantive outcome, but rather on the
procedures used during the "election contest" litigation that followed the voting.
That litigation dragged on through more than half of the congressional term; even if
it ultimately had led to a reversal of the election result, the less popular candidate still
would have represented the district for most of the 110th Congress.4 Even worse, the
litigation ultimately was utterly inconclusive as to the reason for the 18,000 electronic
undervotes because discovery targeting the defective voting system was thwarted
when the voting machines' manufacturer successfully invoked the trade-secret
* Hirsch and Amunson, attorneys in Jenner & Block LLP's Washington, D.C. office,
represented Ms. Christine Jennings in the election-contest cases described in this Article; but
the views expressed here are theirs alone, as are any errors of law, fact, or judgment. The
authors would like to thank Kendall Coffey, Hillary Elmore, Brian Hauck, Mark Herron,
Nora Herron, Kyra Jennings, David Kochman, Steve Paikowsky, Lenny Shambon, Charles
Stewart, Kathy Vermazen, Don Verrilli, Dan Wallach-and especially Chris Jennings, whose
gritty determination made all our efforts worthwhile.
' Jeremy Wallace, Democrats Seize House; CristIn; Buchanan Leads; Slim 368-Vote
Margin Will Trigger a Recountfor the 13th District,SARASOTA HERA.D-TRiB. (Fla.), Nov. 8,
2006, at Al [hereinafter Wallace, Slim Margin].
2 Bob Mahlburg & Maurice Tamman, Dist. 13 Voting Analysis Shows BroadProblem;
SarasotaCounty Vote Review Indicates 13% Undercount,SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.),
Nov. 9, 2006, at Al.
3 COMMvi. ON HOUSE ADMIN., DISMISSING THE ELECTION CONTEST RELATING TO THE
OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE THIRTEENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA,

H.R. REP. No. 110-528, pt. 1, at 7 (2008) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 110-528].
4 See id. at 15-17 (providing a time line of the litigation).
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privilege to block any investigation of the machines or their software by the litigants.5
Today, all we know with any degree of certainty is that the electorate's second choice
was awarded the congressional seat. 6 We will never know why.
That is no way to run an election contest.
Part I of this Article recounts what happened on election day in Florida's
Thirteenth Congressional District. Part II describes and analyzes the state-court
election contest, and Part III does the same for the election contest filed in the House
of Representatives, which is the ultimate arbiter of all contested House elections.
Because this Article's co-authors represented the plaintiff in those election contests,
the discussion reflects first-hand experience litigating the cases. Building on the
problems encountered in Parts II and III, Part IV of this Article addresses several
specific areas ripe for procedural reform. Enacting these reforms, some at the state
level, others at the federal, would help ensure that the citizens of other states and
congressional districts do not suffer the same mistreatment that befell the voters of
Florida's Thirteenth District.
I. THE NOVEMBER 2006 ELECTION FOR CONGRESS IN FLORIDA'S THIRTEENTH
DISTRICT

The November 2006 contest for Representative in Congress from Florida's
Thirteenth District was one of the most hard-fought in the country.' Indeed, with
expenditures totaling more than $13 million, the campaign was the most expensive
House contest in the nation in 2006, and one of the most expensive ever.' Democrat
Christine Jennings and Republican Vein Buchanan engaged in a fight to the finish for
the open seat, previously held by the infamous Katherine Harris, who in 2000 had presided over the Bush/Gore dispute as Florida's Secretary of State.9 Given the fierceness
of the 2006 battle, few were shocked when the election night results showed that the
victor, Vern Buchanan, had squeaked by with a razor-thin margin-only 369 votes.'0
What was surprising, however, was that the election-night numbers showed more
than 18,000 voters apparently had not voted in this hotly contested race.' Most of
5 Id. at 3.

See discussion infra Part IV.
7 See Wallace, Slim Margin, supra note 1.
8 See Jeremy Wallace, District13 Costliest Race at $13.1 M; The CongressionalRace
Brings New Callsfor a Law to Limit Spending, SARAsOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.), Jan. 18,
6

2007, at Al.
' See Peter Whoriskey, Vote DisparityStill a Mystery in Fla. Electionfor Congress,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at A3.

" See Wallace, Slim Margin,supra note 1. The original count showed a 368-vote margin

in the race and was later certified on Nov. 20, 2006, as a 369-vote margin after the recount.
See Official Certificateof the State Elections CanvassingComm'n of the Gen. Election Held
on the Seventh Day of Nov., A.D. 2006, reprintedin H.R. REP. NO. 110-528, supra note 3,

pt. 2, at 1877-92.
"

Mahlburg & Tamman, supra note 2.
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these voters cast choices for every other contest on the ballot-from United States
Senator to hospital board.' 2 Yet, somehow, these voters reportedly registered no
choice at all in the high-profile Jennings-Buchanan congressional race.' 3
The numbers were not a complete surprise, however. Florida allows early voting,
and during the early-voting period, reports had already begun to surface of voters encountering difficulties getting their choices for Congress to register on the electronic
touchscreen voting machines.' 4 Attorneys for the Jennings campaign had sent a letter
to the Supervisor of Elections for Sarasota County, where all of the reports had originated, before election day, citing problems some voters were having casting their
ballots in the congressional race.' 5 In response, Supervisor Kathy Dent instructed all
poll workers to warn voters to look out for the congressional race on the touchscreen's
electronic ballot.' 6 And as more reports poured in on election day, the Jennings campaign held a midday press conference to highlight the issue. 1 7 Yet it was clear that for
thousands of Sarasota County voters, this had not been enough.
A. The Undervote
Sarasota County, where the enormous undervote occurred, is one of the five
counties that constitute Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District.' 8 To put these
18,000 undervotes in perspective, this figure corresponds to undervote rates of 13.9%
for those who voted on touchscreen machines in Sarasota County on election day
and 17.6% for those who did so during the early-voting period. Overall, more than
one out of every seven votes cast on Sarasota County's touchscreen machines turned
up blank for the congressional race. 9 In contrast, the undervote rate for those who
voted via paper absentee ballots in Sarasota County was a mere 2.5%.20 And the
Indeed, in Sarasota County more voters made choices in the hospital-board race than
in the congressional race. See id.
12

13 Id.
'4 See Todd Ruger, Voting Glitch Prompts Warning, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.),
Nov. 5, 2006, at B 1 (noting that, during early voting, voters reported to the Supervisor of
Elections office that "they picked Jennings, but the 13th Congressional District had no vote
registered for either Jennings or Republican Ven Buchanan when a screen reviewing their
votes came up").
"5 Letter from Kendall Coffey, Partner, Coffey &Wright, L.L.P., to Kathy Dent, Supervisor
of Elections, Sarasota County Dep't of Elections (Nov. 2, 2006), reprintedin H.R. REP. No.
110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 3185-93.
16 See Bob Mahlburg, Election Day Trouble Was Widespread; Many Officials Said
the
CongressionalRace Was Their Biggest Headache,SARASOTA HERALD-TRm. (Fla.), Nov. 14,
2006, at Al.
'7

18

See Wallace, Slim Margin, supra note 1.
See H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 6-7 (listing the other counties that

make up the Thirteenth Congressional District).
19 Id.

20

id.
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undervote rate was also historically anomalous: in 2002, the last midterm election,
the congressional undervote rate in Sarasota County had been only 2.2%.2" Sarasota
County's 2006 undervote rate also stood in stark contrast to that of the other four
counties in the Thirteenth District in the same 2006 congressional election: 2.5%
in Charlotte County, 2.1% in DeSoto County, 5.8% in Hardee County, and 2.2% in
Manatee County.22 So Sarasota County, Jennings's political stronghold, accounted for
just over half of the district's total congressional votes, but fully 86% of the district's
congressional undervotes.23
Three theories quickly emerged to explain the outsized undervote.24 The first,
espoused by Sarasota County Election Supervisor Dent, was that voters deliberately
chose not to vote in the congressional race because they were turned off by the two
candidates. 25 The second theory, championed by the maker of the touchscreen voting
machines, Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) of Omaha, Nebraska, was that
the ballot had been poorly designed by Dent's staff and that despite admonitions from
poll workers, voters (especially senior citizens) were simply confused by the ballot design and, therefore, missed making a choice in the congressional matchup.26 The third
theory, argued by Jennings and others, was that the touchscreen voting system had
malfunctioned, misrecording actual votes cast for one candidate or the other as undervotes, likely because of a software "bug" or a hardware defect (or the interaction of
both).27 So Jennings claimed that the machines malfunctioned, ES&S claimed that
the voters malfunctioned, and Dent claimed that the candidates malfunctioned.
B. The iVotronic System
At the time, Sarasota County used the ES&S iVotronic voting system, which
is a direct recording electronic (DRE) system.28 For the iVotronics, local election
21 Id.
22

id.

23
24

Id. at 1200.
See Whoriskey, supra note 9 (summarizing the three main theories used to explain the

undervote).
5 See, e.g., Wallace, Slim Margin,supra note 1 ("We had a real heated race in the primary,
and I think it turned people off." (quoting Supervisor Dent)).
26 See Defendant Election Systems & Software, Inc.'s Answer to Plaintiff Jennings's First
Amended Complaint to Contest Election at 5, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of the

State of Fla., No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2006), cert.denied,
958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). For a screenshot showing the page of the ballot
with the congressional race, see U.S. Gov'TAccOuNTABIITYOFFIcE, GAO-08-425T, RESULTS
OF GAO'S TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS USED INSARASOTA COUNTY IN FLORIDA'S 13TH
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 10(2008) [hereinafter RESULTS OF GAO'S TESTING], available

at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08425t.pdf.
27 See Complaint to Contest Election 1-3, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531
[hereinafter Jennings Complaint].
28 For a more detailed overview of how the iVotronic system works, see RESULTS OF

GAO'S TESTING, supra note 26, at 6-11.
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officials design a multi-screen electronic ballot, which is stored on a device called
a personal electronic ballot (PEB). 29 For each voter, the PEB is then inserted into
an iVotronic machine, and the voter makes her choices using a pressure-sensitive
touchscreen. 30 The voter can "page" through the ballot using buttons at the bottom
of the screen. 3' At the end of the ballot, the voter sees all of her selections on a
summary screen.32 If she failed to vote in a particular contest, the touchscreen
displays in bright red letters, "No selection made."33 Only after the voter confirms
her choices on the summary screen, including any race displaying the words "No
selection made," can she record the votes by pressing the "Vote" button on the
iVotronic. 34 The voter's choices are then recorded to three internal flash
memories.35 The iVotronic system has no paper trail; all data is stored electroni36
cally only.
Unbeknownst to the public until well into 2007, the state and county election
officials had been aware of serious problems with the iVotronic system three months
before election day, but had done nothing to fix them.37 An August 15, 2006 letter
from ES&S to Florida elections officials described a problem ES&S had discovered
with the touchscreens' "smoothing filter" that resulted in a "delayed response to
touch. 38 ES&S noted that this problem "may vary from terminal to terminal and
also may not occur every single time a terminal is used. 39 The manufacturer further
informed state and county officials that this problem would require "an update to the
[source code] and state-level certification" and stated that it planned to complete the
needed repairs "in time for use for the November, 2006 General Election."' But the
update and certification were never completed.4' When asked about this, Sarasota
'
County Elections Supervisor Dent claimed that "[ilt wasn't any big deal."42
Id. at 6-10.
Id.
31 Id.
29

30

32

13

Id.
Id. at 18.

34 Id.
35 Id.

See Paul Quinlan & Jeremy Wallace, CallforPaperTrail,New Election;Democratic
U.S. Lawmakers Condemn the Way Sarasota'sElection Was Run, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.
36

(Fla.), Nov. 16, 2006, at Al.
31See Anita Kumar, Sarasota Officials Ignored WarningAbout Voting Machines, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar. 15, 2007, at Al.
38 Letter from Linda Bennett, Reg'l Account Manager, Election Systems & Software, Inc.,
to Fla. [iVotronic] Users (Aug. 15, 2006), reprintedin H.R. REP. NO. 110-528, supra note 3,
pt. 2, at 2637-38.
39 Id.
40 id.

Kumar, supra note 37.
Id.; see alsoMemorandum Responding to the Honorable Charles A. Gonzalez's April
3, 2007 Letter Regarding the Investigation of the Election for Representative in the One
41
42
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For Sarasota County voters, however, problems with the iVotronics were a very
big deal. Ironically, the November 2006 ballot also included an initiative sponsored
by a citizens group called the Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections (SAFE) requiring
the county to get rid of the paperless iVotronic machines.43 The ballot measure passed
overwhelmingly, 44 but it was too late for those disenfranchised by the iVotronics in
the 2006 congressional election.45
C. The "Recount"
Under Florida law, the Jennings-Buchanan race automatically required a "manual"
recount because the margin of victory had been less than one-quarter of one percent. 46
But with no paper trail, the "manual" recount of electronic undervotes was a meaningless exercise.47 There was simply nothing to manually recount. The "recount"
consisted of the county officials again adding up the numbers that the iVotronic machines told them to add.48 So, it was hardly surprising that the electronic vote totals
remained unchanged.49
The Jennings campaign therefore began preparing to challenge the election results under both Florida and federal law. It was clear that the only way to determine
what had happened to these 18,000 votes was to look at the iVotronic machines and
software.

Hundred Tenth Congress from Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District (Apr. 13, 2007),
reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 2570-73.
43

See Dale White, Sarasota Favors a Paper Ballot, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.),

Nov. 7, 2006, at A18.
44

Id.

Due largely to the Jennings-Buchanan controversy and Governor Charlie Crist's leadership, paperless electronic voting systems have now been banned statewide in Florida. See FLA.
STAT. § 101.56075 (2008).
46 See FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2006) ("If... a candidate for any office was defeated
or eliminated by one-quarter of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office.., the board
4'

responsible for certifying the results of the vote on such race or measure shall order a manual
recount of the overvotes and undervotes cast in the entire geographic jurisdiction of such office
or ballot measure.").
41 See Quinlan & Wallace, supra note 36.
48

id.

Buchanan's lead increased from 368 to 369 votes after recounting all of the ballots,
including paper ballots from military and overseas voters. See Jeremy Wallace, Buchanan
4'

Wins Recount; Legal Action Looms; JenningsMight Challenge Her 369-Vote Loss After a

Significant Undervote in SarasotaCounty, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.), Nov. 18, 2006,
at Al.
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U1.THE STATE-COURT ACTION
The purpose of Jennings's state-court action was threefold: first, to find out why
the congressional undervote rate was so high for Sarasota County's electronic ballots;
second, to find out whether that abnormally high rate changed the election's outcome;
and third, to prevent Buchanan from taking office in early January 2007 if, in fact,
his election victory reflected voting-machine malfunction, rather than the will of the
electorate.5" If Buchanan were seated when the new 110th Congress convened in early
January, the focus inevitably would shift from the state court to the United States
House of Representatives, so speed was critically important.
The "primary consideration in an election contest is whether the will of the people
has been effected."'" But under the Florida election-contest law, there are only four
grounds upon which a candidate or voter can challenge the result of an election:
(a) [m]isconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election
official ... sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
election[;] (b) [i]neligibility of the successful candidate for the
nomination or office in dispute[;] © [r]eceipt of a number of
illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to
change or place in doubt the result of the election; [or] (d) [p]roof
that any elector, [or] election official. . was given or offered a
bribe or reward [or]... anything of value for the purpose of procuring the successful candidate's nomination or election ......
A. The State-Court Complaint
On November 20, 2006, within hours of the state certifying the vote totals,
Jennings filed an election-contest complaint in Florida state court. 53 The complaint
" See Jennings Complaint, supra note 27.
5' Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 967
(1976); see also Barber v. Moody, 229 So. 2d 284, 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ('There
[is] no doubt that the purpose of the statutes permitting election contests is to prevent the
thwarting of the will of the electors either by fraud or by common mistakes honestly made."),
cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1970); COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., EXAMINATION AND
RECOUNT OF THE VOTES CAST FOR REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS, FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICT OF INDIANA, AT THE GENERAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 8,1960, H.R. REP. No. 87513, at 22 (1961).
" FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(a)-(d) (2006). After the 2000 presidential election, the Florida
legislature eliminated a fifth, "catch-all" provision allowing for an election contest based on
"[a]ny other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person other than the
successful candidate was the person duly nominated or elected to the office in question." See
2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 102.168 by deleting section 3(e)).
" See Jennings Complaint, supra note 27.

404
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alleged that a malfunction of the iVotronic machines had caused the rejection of a
number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.'
Jennings named the state and county election officials as defendants, as well as Ven
Buchanan, as Florida's election-contest statute required.55 Along with her complaint,
Jennings moved for expedited discovery and requested access to the ES&S hardware,
software, and source code in the possession of the state and county.56 Jennings requested an immediate hearing on her motion, citing the provision of the electioncontest statute that entitled her to expeditious treatment.57
In her complaint, Jennings quoted the sworn affidavits of numerous voters who
came forward during or immediately following the election to describe the difficulties
they had encountered in registering their votes on the touchscreen machines.58 These
citizens attested that they had voted for Jennings, but when they reached the end of
the ballot, the summary screen showed that no vote had been recorded in the congressional race.59 Jennings's complaint also quoted contemporaneous "incident report"
forms kept by the Supervisor of Elections that reflected problems with the iVotronics.60
According to the county's own records, multiple iVotronic machines "were taken out
of service on Election Day because they were 'slow to respond to touch,' or 'required
a hard/extended touch before [a] vote was recognized,' or because they were 'not
recording some votes [and] the touchscreen was not working properly." '' 61 Later, in
Id. at 8-9.
5 See FLA. STAT. § 102.168(4) (2006); Jennings Complaint, supra note 27, at 4.
14

See Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents and for Inspection of Tangible
Things at 6-7, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of the State of Fla., No. 2006-CA2973,2006 WL 4404531 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21,2006); Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Expedited
Discovery, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 440453 1.
" See FLA. STAT. § 102.168(7) (2006) ("Any candidate, qualified elector, or taxpayer
presenting such a contest to a circuit judge is entitled to an immediate hearing.").
56

58

See Jennings Complaint, supra note 27, at 10-17.

9 For example, one Sarasota County voter filed an affidavit stating:
I went through the ballot making my selections on the iVotronic touchscreen voting machine and took my time making sure that I voted in
every race. I am certain that I cast a vote for Christine Jennings. When
I reviewed the ballot at the end of the voting process, I noted that the race
for the 13th Congressional District ...indicated that I had made no
selection.... I have more than 15 years experience in selling computer
systems, five of those years are in selling touch screen systems. Based
on my experience, I believe there was a software "bug" in the voting
machine software causing the software not to register the touch.
Affidavit of AlisaJanette Behne,Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL4404531; see also
H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 2641-654 (providing examples of other affidavits
submitted by voters).
o Jennings Complaint, supra note 27, at 17-18.
6' H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 465-66; see also id., pt. 2, at 3024-50
(providing examples of log sheets kept by the supervisor of elections).
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discovery, Jennings learned that even Buchanan's wife reported difficulty voting for
her husband, apparently pressing the "Vote" button three times before her vote
would register. 62
In addition to these eyewitness accounts and official reports, Jennings attached
to her complaint two expert declarations.63 As to whether there were a number of legal
votes "sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election," the first expert
was Professor Charles Stewart III, the chair of the political-science department at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).64 Professor Stewart examined data regarding undervote rates in Sarasota and surrounding counties and concluded that about
14,000 of the 18,000 undervotes were unintentional. 65 Using the actual "ballot-image
logs" for each individual ballot to examine voters' preferences in other races, Professor
Stewart later determined that if the 14,000 unintended undervotes had been properly
recorded, Jennings would have won the election by more than 3,000 votes. 66 Professor
Stewart further found that even if only 1,500 of the 18,000 undervotes were due to
a malfunction of the iVotronics, the results of the race would have been reversed,
with Jennings rather than Buchanan prevailing.67
As to whether the rejection of these thousands of legal votes had been caused by
a malfunction of the iVotronics, Jennings also attached to her complaint the declaration
of Professor Dan S. Wallach of the Computer-Science Department at Rice University.68
Professor Wallach postulated that the cause of the anomalous undervote rate might
be a software bug in the iVotronics and proposed rigorous testing of the iVotronic
system, including its source code, to determine whether such a bug existed.69
B. The Thwarted Discovery Process

The election contest was assigned to Florida Circuit Judge William L. Gary in
Tallahassee.7' The day after the complaint was filed, Judge Gary held a non-evidentiary
See Memorandum from Sally Tibbetts to Ron Turner (Dec. 26, 2006), reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 3069 ("Mrs. Buchanan indicated that she had
to hit the button more than once, I think she said three times-to record her vote for Mr.
Buchanan.").
63 See Declaration of Charles Stewart III on Excess Undervotes Cast in Sarasota County,
Florida for the 13th Congressional District Race, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531 [hereinafter Declaration of Stewart]; Declaration of Dan S. Wallach, Jennings,No.
2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531 [hereinafter Declaration of Wallach].
' Declaration of Stewart, supra note 63, at 1.
65 Id. at 2-3.
62

66 id.
67 Id. at 2-3, 24-35.
61 See Declaration of Wallach, supra note 63.
69

70

Id. at 4-5.
See Hearing Transcript, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of the State of Fla.,

No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2006), reprintedin H.R. REP.
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hearing on Jennings's request for expedited discovery.71 He denied the request and
instead granted the state and county defendants fifteen days to file written responses.72
Judge Gary also stated that ES&S, the manufacturer of the iVotronic system, must be
given "an opportunity to be heard" before he would consider granting any request for
access to the system's source code.73 Given Judge Gary's admonition that he would
not allow access to the iVotronic source code without hearing from ES&S, Jennings
amended her complaint to name ES&S as a defendant.74
Jennings's request for the source code was critical because the code is what
allows a computer scientist to "read" electronic-voting-system software and determine whether a bug exists that could have caused a voter's choices to be incorrectly
recorded, or not to be recorded at all. 5 "Without access to the source code that runs
the [electronic voting machine], auditing becomes a pointless endeavor because all
an auditor has to work with is potentially flawed election data produced by a black
box in which it is impossible to see how it created that data. 7 6 Under Florida law,
ES&S was required to keep a copy of the source code for the iVotronic system in
escrow with the state.77 Jennings, therefore, filed a motion to compel the state to
produce the escrowed source code, reiterating that although ES&S may have an
interest in the litigation, the discovery she sought was in the state's possession.78
Jennings also sought to compel the county to produce eight actual iVotronic machines and related equipment used in the election.79
The state and county defendants objected to producing the vast majority of the
materials requested (including all of Jennings's requests for hardware, software, and
No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1,at 895. Under Florida law, election-contest complaints for
multi-county races must be filed in Leon County. FLA. STAT. § 102.1685 (2006).
" See Hearing Transcript at 42, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 896.
72 See Response of Elections Canvassing Comm'n, Secretary of State Sue M. Cobb, and
Dawn K. Roberts to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Expedited Discovery at 2-3, Jennings,No.
2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531.
73 See Hearing Transcript at 42, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 896.
14 See First Amended Complaint to Contest Election at 1-2, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973,
2006 WL 4404531.
"5See Andrew Massey, "But We Have to ProtectOurSource! ": How Electronic Voting
Companies' ProprietaryCode Ruins Elections, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 233, 234
(2004).
76 Id. at 243.
77 See FLA. STAT. § 101.5607(1)(a) (2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.015(5)(f)
(2006).
71 See Plaintiff Jennings's Motion to Compel Production of Items Within the Custody and
Control of the State Under Fla. Stat. § 101.5607 and Fla.Admin. Code Rule 1S-2.015(5)(f) at
1, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531.
79 See Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Expedited Discovery at 3, Jennings,No. 2006-CA2973, 2006 WL 4404531.

20081

THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING VOTES

source code), claiming that these were "trade secrets" belonging to ES&S.8 ° Florida's
evidence code provides for a trade-secret privilege, granting that "[a] person has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade
secret owned by that person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice."8 The evidence code further notes that "[w]hen the court
directs disclosure, it shall take the protective measures that the interests of the holder
of the privilege, the interests of the parties, and the furtherance of justice require.""
Invoking the trade-secret privilege to prevent scrutiny of a contested election was
apparently unprecedented. The privilege is typically invoked either in commercial disputes, for example when competitors are engaged in a lawsuit over theft of intellectual
property and access to the property is at issue, or in products-liability cases, for example when plaintiffs seek to discover how the product that harmed them was made.83
Never before had state and county election officials hidden behind a voting-machine
manufacturer's invocation of the trade-secret privilege to avoid investigating a disputed election.
Nonetheless, recognizing that the defendants were unwilling to provide the requested discovery due to the trade-secret privilege, Jennings took two unusual steps
that she believed would expedite the discovery process and more speedily resolve the
election contest. First, she conceded-solely for purposes of her motion-that the
materials she had requested could be deemed trade secrets, thereby relieving the defendants of the potentially time-consuming burden of proving that the privilege did apply
in this situation. 84 Second, Jennings proposed that her experts would be bound by
a stringent protective order that would accommodate any interest ES&S might have
in protecting its proprietary information from business competitors, while ensuring
that Jennings's experts could access the evidence needed to test the allegations of her
8
complaintY.
After some delay (fostered by the judge's unwillingness to hold a casemanagement conference, issue a scheduling order, or accord the case priority status
80

See Defendant Dent's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents and

for Inspection of Tangible Things at 3-4, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531;
State Defendants' Response to Plaintiff Jennings's Request for Production of Documents and
for Inspection of Tangible Things, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531.
81 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (2006).
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Seta Corp. of Boca v. Office of Attorney Gen., 756 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (ordering discovery because the party seeking trade secrets was "not a
competitor" and protections could be taken to prevent disclosure to non-party business
competitors); Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Egly, 507 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) ("The likelihood of [any] abuse of the discovery process is lessened where, as here,
the party seeking discovery appears to have no real interest in the business techniques of the
[party invoking the trade-secret privilege].").
84 See Plaintiff Jennings's Motion for Entry of a Protective Order at 2, Jennings, No.
2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531.
85 See [Proposed] Protective Order, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531,
reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 860.
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as required by Florida law), ES&S eventually responded by requesting an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Jennings actually needed these discovery items.86
Under Florida law, the test for determining whether trade secrets should be disclosed is whether the plaintiff has a "reasonable necessity for the requested materials."8" But the "burden is on the party resisting discovery to show 'good cause' for
protecting or limiting discovery by demonstrating that... disclosure may be harmful." 8
It seemed obvious that in a case alleging voting-machine malfunction, one would of
course have a "reasonable necessity" to access the voting machines themselves, and
their software. Equally obvious is that a stringent protective order, backed by the
power to hold anyone who violated the order in contempt of court, would prevent any
harmful disclosure of trade secrets. Moreover, neither Jennings nor her experts were
competitors to ES&S, so the whole raisond'etrefor the privilege did not apply here.
But the Florida state courts did not ultimately see it this way.89
C. Jennings'sDay in Court
A full month after Jennings filed her state-court complaint and discovery requests, with the December holidays rapidly approaching, the trial judge finally held
an evidentiary hearing to determine if Jennings had a "reasonable necessity" to access
the iVotronic system to determine whether defects in that system had cost her the
election.' At the hearing, Jennings presented testimony from Professors Stewart
and Wallach. 91 Neither Buchanan nor the governmental defendants who were the targets of Jennings's motion to compel presented any witnesses.92 ES&S presented one
expert on elections and voting patterns, Professor Michael C. Herron of Dartmouth
College's Government Department.9 3
Consistent with the declaration he had filed in support of Jennings's complaint,
Professor Stewart testified that the undervote rate in Sarasota County was far above
normal, that Jennings would have won the election had the undervote rate been anySee Defendant Election Systems & Software, Inc.'s Motion Requesting Fifteen (15)
Days to Respond to Plaintiffs Request for Production, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006
WL 4404531, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 884.
7 Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221,222 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
88 Am. Express Travel Related Services, Inc. v. Cruz, 761 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
89 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
90 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 6, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1155.
9'See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 25-168, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1160-95.
9 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 4, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP.No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1,at 1154.
9'See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
86
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where near normal, and that machine malfunction had likely altered the election's outcome. 94 Stewart's expert statistical analyses of the election returns, on a machineby-machine basis, showed that the undervote problem was worst on touchscreens that
were set up and "calibrated" on days when the county election staff was busiestwhich strongly suggested that the undervote rates were tied to machine malfunction, not
voter confusion or some other factor. 95 Also consistent with his declaration, Professor
Wallach testified that machine malfunction could have caused the abnormal undervote
rate and described the investigation of the hardware, software, and source code needed
to test that hypothesis.9
ES&S's political science expert Professor Herron testified-without ever having
examined the iVotronic hardware, software, or source code and with no computerscience expertise whatsoever-that poor ballot design was the sole cause of the elevated undervote rate. 97 According to Professor Herron, because the congressional
race appeared on the same page as the gubernatorial race, voters simply "skipped"
the former. 98 Professor Herron' s theory also posited that each of these voters must
have missed the summary page's bright red warning, telling the voter there had been
"No Selection Made" in the congressional race. 99 But Professor Herron agreed with
Professor Stewart that the undervote rate in Sarasota County was not normal and that
had it been normal, Jennings would have won the election by roughly 3,000 votes.'1 °
ES&S also introduced into evidence a "Parallel Test Summary Report," which
the state defendants produced the night before the evidentiary hearing.'0 ' The report
9 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 25-72, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1160-71.
9' See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 68-71, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1170-71; see also
Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 155-56, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 440453 1,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1192.
96 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 148-56, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1190-92.
97 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 257-389, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006
WL 4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1236-69.
98 See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 277, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1241.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 29-34 (discussing how the iVotronic voting system
works).
"o See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 330-31, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. NO. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1255 (stating that Jennings
would have won if one attributed the undervote to machine malfunction); see also Laurin
Frisina, Michael C. Herron, James Honaker &Jeffrey B. Lewis, BallotFonnats,Touchscreens,
and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006 Midterm Elections in Florida,7 ELECTION L.J. 25, 25
(2008) ("[T]here is essentially a 100 percent chance that the 13th Congressional District
election result would have been reversed in the absence of the large Sarasota undervote.").
101 See Parallel Test Summary Report, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531,
reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, at 1285.
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described the state's post-election testing often iVotronic machines, five of which had
not even been used during the election."0 In the test, the state used "mock voters,"
who were permanent employees of the State's Division of Elections, to carefully enter
their selections into the iVotronic machines using pre-set scripts. °3 These scripts
assumed that those who undervoted did so intentionally.' 4 The report concluded
that because these ten iVotronic machines recorded the scripts correctly, the "parallel
tests were successful in demonstrating 100% accuracy in recording the vote selections
as indicated on the review screens."105 The report was introduced over Jennings's objection that it was hearsay and that she should be allowed the opportunity to crossexamine its author."°
D. The Ruling and the Appeal

Nine days after the evidentiary hearing on Jennings's "reasonable necessity" for
discovery, Judge Gary issued an order denying her requests for access to the iVotronic
hardware, software, and source code. 0 7 The court stated that granting Jennings's
motions to compel "would require [it] to find that it is reasonably necessary for the
Plaintiffs to have access to the trade secrets of [ES&S] based on nothing more than
speculation and conjecture, and would result in destroying or at least gutting the protections afforded those who own the trade secrets."'' 08 Thus, Judge Gary held that
ES&S' s trade-secret privilege trumped the public's right to know what had gone so
very wrong in the 2006 congressional election.' 9
Jennings immediately appealed the trial court's ruling by filing an emergency
petition for a writ of certiorari in Florida's First District Court of Appeal. "0 Given that
the term of the contested office was a mere two years and that Buchanan was about to
be sworn into the office while Jennings still had not even gained access to basic dis-

'o2 See Parallel Test Summary Report at 4, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, at 1288.
103 See Parallel Test Summary Report at 6, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL

4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, at 1290.
"' See Parallel Test Summary Report at 2-3, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, at 1286-87.
"05 See Parallel Test Summary Report at 8, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, at 1292.
1
See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 253-56, Jennings,No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL
4404531, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1235-36.
" See Order on Motions at 2-4, Jennings, No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531.
108 Id. at 3.
'09 See id. at 4.

"' See Emergency Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing
Comm'n of the State of Fla., 958 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), reprintedin H.R.
REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 535.
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covery, she also requested expedited consideration of her appeal.11 ' Paradoxically,
the appellate court granted Jennings's petition for expedited consideration," 2 but then
waited five months to issue a ruling." 3 On June 18, 2007, the appellate court issued
a terse two-page opinion concluding that "an order denying discovery is ordinarily
not reviewable by certiorari because the harm from such orders, as a general rule, can
be rectified on plenary appeal.""' 4 The order stated that Jennings had not met the
"extraordinary burden to demonstrate that the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of law, resulting in irreparable, material injury for the remaining trial
proceedings that cannot be rectified on direct appeal."" 5 In other words, Jennings
should proceed with her case, without the key discovery, inevitably lose in the trial
court, and then bring a second appeal from that unfavorable final judgment-just to
raise precisely the same issues she already had raised in her "expedited" emergency
appeal. 16 Jumping through those additional hoops would take months or even years.
Jennings's state-court case was effectively finished.
II. THE FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

At the same time that Jennings was pursuing her state-court suit, she also initiated
an action in the United States House of Representatives."' Under Article I, Section 5
of the United States Constitution, "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."' '8 The House of Representatives,
therefore, bears the ultimate constitutional responsibility to adjudicate disputed House
elections, regardless of any state-court action. 9
Successful House election contests are rare, but hardly unprecedented. 20 In
contested-election cases, the House has found the contestant to be entitled to the seat

"'
See Emergency Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24-25, Jennings, 958 So. 2d 1083,
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 565-66.
12 Court Order, Jennings, 958 So. 2d 1083 (No. 1007-11).
"' See Jennings, 958 So. 2d 1083 (denying certiorari).
"1

Id. at 1084 (quoting Ruiz v. Steiner, 599 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).

115

Id.

Id.; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 134.
1"S U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1; see Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445,447 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987) (explaining that the Constitution provides not just
6

"..

that "each House 'may Judge' [congressional elections], but that each House 'shall be the
Judge'); McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The House is not only
'Judge' but also final arbiter.").
119 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 5, cl. 1.
120 See Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the House
of Representatives, 1789-2002, 18 STuD. INAM. POL. DEv. 112, 115 (2004) ("There have

been 601 contested election cases in the House [from 1789-2002), or an average of 5.6 per
Congress.").
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on 128 occasions; and the election has been voided, and the seat vacated, in another
66 cases.' Most of these successful contests, however, took place many decades
ago, with the greatest concentration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.'22
To discharge its constitutional responsibilities, the House generally employs the
procedures outlined in the Federal Contested Elections Act (FCEA).' 23 The FCEA is
largely a procedural statute. It sets forth rules about who may contest an election, the
form of a notice of contest, service of such notice, and deadlines for various motions
and discovery processes, as well as for final briefing.' 24 But the statute says almost
nothing about the substantive standards for judging a notice of contest. 12 Under the
FCEA, the candidate contesting the election must file a notice of contest within thirty
days of state certification of the election results.' 26 The only substantive requirements for the notice are that the contestant must "state grounds sufficient to change
[the] result of [the] election" and must "claim [the] right to [the] contestee's seat"
in Congress. 127 The contestee then has thirty days either to file an answer or to move
for dismissal. 128 Under the FCEA, the burden of proof rests with the contestant, who
"must overcome the presumption of the regularity of an election, and its results, evidenced by the certificate of election presented by the contestee."' 2' The FCEA also sets
forth procedures for an adversarial system of taking depositions and other discovery. 30
Traditionally, the Committee on House Administration appoints a bipartisan threemember task force to investigate and report on an FCEA proceeding.' 3' Generally, the
task force investigates the contest and makes a recommendation to the Committee
on House Administration, which then issues a report and sends a resolution to the full
House regarding the disposition of the contest. 3 2 "The committee may recommend,
and the House may approve by a simple majority vote, a decision affirming the right
12

Id. at 120; see also H.R. Res. 231, 73d Cong., 78 CONG. REC. 1510 (1934) (agreeing to

a House resolution stating that there had been no valid election, that the state certified winner
was not entitled to a seat, and that the Speaker of the House should notify the Governor of
the vacancy).
122 For a general description of these successful contests, see Jenkins, supra note 120.
123 2 U.S.C. §§ 381-96 (2006).
124 2 U.S.C. §§ 381-93.
125 2 U.S.C. § 383(b).
126 2 U.S.C. § 382(a).
127 2 U.S.C. § 383(b).
'"

2 U.S.C. § 382(a).

129 JACK MASKELL & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RES. SERVICE, PROCEDURES FOR

CONTESTED ELECTION CASES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, at Summary (2008)

[hereinafter CRS REPORT]; see also 2 U.S.C. § 385 (2006) (stating that "the burden is upon
[the] contestant to prove that the election results entitle him to contestee's seat").
130 CRS REPORT, supra note 129; see 2 U.S.C. §§ 386-93 (2006).
m'' See CRS REPORT, supra note 129, at CRS-14 (noting an election contest in the 99th
Congress in which the House Administration Committee "appointed a three-person Task
Force composed of two Democrats and one Republican").
132

Id. at Summary.
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of the contestee to the seat, may seat the contestant, or find that neither party is entitled
' 33
to be finally seated and declare a vacancy."'
A. Jennings's FCEA Complaint

On December 20, 2006, Jennings filed an FCEA Notice of Contest stating that the
pervasive malfunctioning of the iVotronic system in Sarasota County, as recounted
by numerous eyewitnesses, provided grounds sufficient to change the result of the
election.' 3 As to her entitlement to the seat, Jennings noted the consensus among
political scientists and statisticians that (1) the vast majority of the undervote was unintended and (2) had the votes been counted as they were intended, Jennings would
have beaten Buchanan by approximately 3,000 votes.'35 Within the statutorily re1 36
quired thirty days, Buchanan filed a motion to dismiss the contest.
On January 4, 2007, while Jennings's state-contest proceeding was still pending
in the Florida appellate court and her federal notice of contest was pending before
the House, Vern Buchanan was sworn in as the Representative in the 110th Congress
for Florida's Thirteenth District.137 At that time, then-Chairwoman of the House
Administration Committee Juanita Millender-McDonald hoped that the state courts
would still allow Jennings the discovery necessary to determine whether the iVotronic
machines had malfunctioned. 38 To that end, the Chairwoman wrote to the Florida
appellate court to express her desire that the discovery matters be expeditiously resolved by the state judiciary.1 39 The appellate court, however, refused to consider or
even docket her letter.' 4° And, as recounted above, the court then sat on Jennings's
appeal for five months before ultimately denying further discovery.

Id.
"3 See Notice of Contest Regarding the Election for Representative in the One Hundred

133

Tenth Congress From Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District, reprintedin H.R. REP. No.
110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1626-37.
135 Notice of Contest Regarding the Election for Representative in the One Hundred
Tenth

Congress From Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District at 1-24, reprintedin H.R. REP.
No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1626-38.
136 See Congressman Buchanan's Motion to Dismiss Election Contest, reprintedin H.R.
REP. NO. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 1655.
137 See H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 4.

138 See Letter from Juanita Millender-McDonald, Chairwoman, Comm. on House Admin.,
to Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk, Fla. First Dist. Court of Appeal, reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 25.
139 id.

"4 Court Order, Jennings v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n of the State of Fla., 958 So.
2d 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (No. 2006-CA-2973).
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B. The FCEA Task-Force Investigation

Because there had been some hope that the discovery issues might be resolved in
the state courts, the three-member task force appointed to investigate the JenningsBuchanan contest was not established until March 23, 2007,' and did not officially
meet for the first time until May 2, 2007,142 four months into the twenty-four-month
congressional term. 143 The delay was also due in part to the recalcitrance of the
House Republicans to nominate anyone to the task force: the Ranking Member of the
House Administration Committee stated that he felt "organizing the task force while
Ms. Jennings's case is under careful consideration in the Florida Circuit and Appeals
Courts is an inappropriate interference of the federal legislative branch in state judicial
proceedings."' 44 This theme was echoed in Buchanan's motion to dismiss Jennings's
FCEA case, which accused Jennings of bringing the action while failing to exhaust
145
all state remedies.
Nonetheless, the Republicans eventually nominated a member to the task force,
and at its first official meeting the panel voted unanimously to retain the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to investigate the election.'" The GAO was thereby
engaged "to design and propose testing protocols to determine the reliability of the
' 147
equipment used in the FL- 13 election."

H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 15.
Id. at 16.
143 Prior to its first official meeting, the task force held a closed-door briefing with counsel
for Jennings and Buchanan. At that briefing session, counsel were asked to address four issues:
(1) whether there were compelling reasons for the task force not to proceed with an investigation at that time; (2) what discovery the parties anticipated undertaking if the task force
141
142

were to authorize discovery in the FCEA proceeding; (3) whether the task force could rely on
any of the testing of the iVotronic system that had been done to date by the State or county;
and (4) how the task force could protect the proprietary interests of ES&S if discovery would
entail an examination of trade secrets. See Letter from Charles A. Gonzalez, Chairman, Task
Force, to Hayden R. Dempsey, Counsel (Apr. 3, 2007), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528,
supra note 3, pt. 1, at 59-60.
'4
Letter from Vernon J. Ehlers, Ranking Member, Comm. on House Admin., to Juanita
Millender-McDonald, Chairwoman, Comm. on House Admin. (Apr. 16,2007), reprintedin
H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 61; see also Jeremy Wallace, GOP, Seeking
'Clarity,' Holds Up Task Force, SARASOTA HERALD-TRM. (Fla.), Mar. 28, 2007, at Al.
115 Congressman Vein Buchanan's Motion to Dismiss Election Contest, reprintedin
H.R.
REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 1655-97.
6 Congressman Kevin McCarthy, the task force's Republican member, first voted not to
initiate any investigation into the election. But once the task force voted 2-to-I to commence
an investigation, he voted in favor of retaining GAO to conduct it. H.R. REP. No. 110-528,
supra note 3, pt. 1, at 21.
147 Id.
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Neither Jennings nor Buchanan had recommended retaining the GAO. Instead,
Buchanan had argued that no investigation was necessary, 148 while Jennings had set
forth a specific proposal for an adversarial process, consistent with the adversarial
nature of the FCEA statute, allowing each side's experts to undertake specific testing,
with deadlines that would ensure completion of their investigation into the iVotronic
system within forty-five days.' 49 Jennings recommended that the task force subpoena the key evidence (the iVotronic hardware, software, and source code), divide
it between the two parties' expert teams, ask the parties' experts to analyze the evidence and submit reports and counter-reports under oath, assess those reports, and then
resolve the case on an expedited basis. 0 The task force rejected this forty-five-day
plan in favor of retaining the GAO.'
The task force then let forty-three more days pass before approving the GAO's
proposed "engagement plan" on June 14, 2007.152 The GAO advised the task force
that it expected its "engagement" would not be completed until at least September
2007.13 Unlike Jennings's proposal, which the task force had rejected, the GAO's
plan did not involve securing or testing any of the voting machines that Sarasota
County actually had used in the 2006 election.' 54 Rather, in this initial engagement,
the GAO proposed simply to study the testing that had already been completed by the
State and county to determine whether any further testing of the iVotronic system
was warranted.' By that time, the state had issued a second report exonerating the
iVotronic machines based on an investigation in which a team of academics performed
a static "reading" of the iVotronic source code, but did not perform any hands-on
16
testing of the code on actual iVotronic machines.
148

See Congressman Vein Buchanan's Motion to Dismiss Election Contest, reprintedin

H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 1655.

9 Memorandum Responding to the Honorable Charles A. Gonzalez's April 3,2007 Letter
Regarding the Investigation of the Election for Representative in the One Hundred Tenth
Congress from Florida's Thirteenth Congressional District (Apr. 13, 2007), reprintedin H.R.
REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 2604-07.
Id.
151 H.R.
150

152

REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 21.

Id. at 16.

GAO Engagement Plan 4 (June 14,2007), reprintedin H.R. REP. NO. 110-528, supra
note 3, pt. 1, at 81.
151

'14

GAO Engagement Plan 1-4 (June 14, 2007), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 110-528,

supra note 3, pt. 1, at 78-81.
1' GAO Engagement Plan l(June 14, 2007), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra

note 3, pt. 1, at 78.
156

ALEC YASINSAC ET AL., SoFrwARE REvIEw AND SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE

ES&S

8.0.1.2 VOTINGMAcHNEFIRMwARE (2007), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528,
supra note 3, pt. 2, at 3071-137. For a detailed critique of this report, pointing out its many
shortcomings, see DAVID L. DILL & DAN S. WALLACH, STONES UNTURNED: GAPS IN THE
IVOTRONIC

INVESTIGATION OF SARASOTA'S DISPUTED CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION (2007), reprintedin

H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 2618-35.
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As it turned out, it took the GAO the next four months to determine "[t]o what
extent were tests conducted on the voting systems in Sarasota County prior to the general election and what were the results of those tests" and, "[c]onsidering the tests that
were conducted on the voting systems from Sarasota County after the general election,
[whether] additional tests [were] needed to determine whether the voting systems contributed to the undervote[.]"'' 7 On October 2, 2007, nine months into the twentyfour-month term of office, the GAO presented its findings in a report carefully tided
"Further Testing Could Provide Increased But Not Absolute Assurance That Voting
Systems Did Not Cause Undervotes in Florida's 13th Congressional District."' 58
Thus, almost a full year after the election, the GAO finally decided to test the actual
iVotronic machines and to look at the source code-steps that Jennings had proposed
1 59
undertaking within days of the election.
The GAO did not, however, undertake the battery of tests that Jennings's computer science experts had recommended. Instead, the GAO conducted just three limited tests: (1) a firmware verification test conducted on 115 of the 1,500 iVotronic
machines that Sarasota County had deployed in the 2006 elections; (2) parallel testing
on ten iVotronics; and (3) calibration testing on two iVotronic machines." 6 On
February 8, 2008, after another four months had passed and with the congressional
term more than half over, the GAO finally issued its findings that the iVotronic system
did not contribute to the undervote and further testing was not necessary.16 1 The GAO
report did not analyze whether voter confusion caused by poor ballot design contributed significantly to the undervote, much less whether poor ballot design alone could
explain the entirety of the abnormal undervote. Nor did the report offer any other
' 62
explanation of what caused thousands of Sarasota County votes to "disappear."'
Shortly thereafter, the Committee on House Administration, and then the full
House, approved a resolution dismissing Jennings's case.'63 Jennings's election contest was finished.

' GAO Engagement Plan l(June 14, 2007), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra
note 3, pt. 1, at 78.
s U.S. Gov'TACCOUNTABLrY OFFICE, GAO-08-97T, FURTHERTESTING COUJLD PROVIDE
INCREASED BUT NOT ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT VOTING SYSTEMS DID NOT CAUSE
UNDERVOTES INFLORIDA'S 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (2008), availableathttp://www

.gao.gov/new.items/do897t.pdf.
'19 Id. at 17.
'60
161
162

See RESULTS OF GAO'S TESTING, supra note 26, at 1-2.
Id. at 3-4.
See Verified Voting Foundation, GAO Report Not a Clean Bill of Health for Voting

Machines 1-4, http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.orgdownloads/VVF-Statement-GAO.pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
163 H.R. RES. 989, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
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IV. LESSONS FROM THE FLORIDA CONGRESSIONAL DEBACLE

The injustice of the outcome of the election contest for Florida's Thirteenth

Congressional District is obvious: despite the consensus view of experts on both sides
of the dispute that about 3,000 more voters attempted to vote for Jennings than for
Buchanan, the seat was awarded to Buchanan. 64 So, for two years, the people of
Florida's Thirteenth District have been "represented" in Congress not by the candidate of their choice, but by the runner-up.
Even setting aside the substantive unfairness of the outcome, the JenningsBuchanan election contest reveals a striking set of procedural problems. The case took
more than fifteen months to be "resolved," by which time most of the congressional
term had expired. 165 And even then, the litigation never came even remotely close to
answering why Sarasota County's iVotronic system recorded 14,000 excess undervotes.' 66 When an election contest neither answers the fundamental questions about
what went wrong nor results in the correct candidate being seated, something has gone
seriously awry.
So, what lessons are to be learned from this case? The most obvious reforms are
substantive ones--demanding tougher tests before certifying voting machines, in-

sisting on paper trails or other means for independently verifying votes, and perhaps
replacing paperless electronic touchscreens with precinct-based optical-scan systems
or ballot-marking devices, just to mention a few.1 67 And undoubtedly, stricter require168
ments for ballot design should be enacted in most states.
But those reforms are not the focus of this Article. Rather, here the focus is on
how to conduct election contests, not elections. Our suggestions for reform fall into
four categories: (1) the discovery of alleged trade secrets, (2) the timing of state-

164Id.

165 See H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 15-17.
166 See Verified Voting Foundation, supra note 162, at 4.
167

For a readable, nontechnical, and opinionated discussion of some of these topics, see

AVIEL D. RUBIN, BRAVE NEW BALLOT: THE BATTLE TO SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY IN THE

AGE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING (2006). See generally Susan M. Boland & Therese Clarke
Arado, 0 Brave New World? ElectronicVoting Machinesand Internet Voting: An Annotated

Bibliography,27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 313 (2007).
168 See LAwRENCENORDEN ETAL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BETrERBALLOTS (2008),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/d6bd3c56be0d0cc861_hlm6i92vl.pdf; see also id. at

24-27 (recommending that, unlike Sarasota County's 2006 congressional and gubernatorial
ballots, two contests should never be placed on one screen). But see FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
BD. OF ELECTIONS, HELPING FRANKLIN COUNTY VOTE IN 2008: WAITING LINEs 4 (2008),
availableathttp://vote.fi-ankincuntyohio.gov/assets/pdf/208/genera/gen2008-voting-machine-

allocation.pdf (arguing that the "one-page-per-item" rule slows down the average voter by
about seventy-five seconds, dramatically lengthens lines at polling places, and does not signifi-

cantly diminish voter confusion).
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court actions, (3) the relationship between state-court actions and FCEA cases, and
(4) the process for adjudicating FCEA claims.
A. Discovery of Alleged Trade Secrets
If the Florida courts had properly applied the trade-secret privilege in the
Jennings-Buchanan election contest, the defendants would have been forced to hand
over the iVotronic hardware, software, and source code, subject to a protective order.'69
This case, however, highlights the need for express statutory guidance on this issue.
Legislatures should declare unambiguously that the trade-secret privilege has only
limited application to voting technology and cannot be invoked to hide defects in our
electoral processes. If a voting-machine manufacturer invokes the privilege in an
election contest, the solution is not to block discovery entirely, but rather to order
appropriate protective measures. 17 In some circumstances, there may be risks to the
electoral system itself if voting-machine source code becomes widely available. 7'
But those concerns are best addressed through protective measures, backed by the
courts' contempt power, not by outright denial of discovery.'7 2
More generally, election-contest statutes should emphasize the need for liberal discovery. Georgia law, for example, expressly grants trial judges in contested-election
cases the power to do everything "necessary and proper" to expeditiously hear and
resolve the dispute, including "to compel the production of evidence which may be
required at such hearing."' 173 And Illinois law allows plaintiffs in contests involving
statewide elections to request the examination of "records and equipment under the
control of an election authority."' 174 To deter the filing of frivolous requests, the
175
Illinois statute requires the posting of a bond.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "orders forbidding any disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential commercial information are rare. More commonly, the trial court will enter a protective order restricting disclosure to counsel or to the parties." Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
170 See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public
Infrastructure,59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 180-83, 187-93 (2007).
171 See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Transparency and Access to Source Code in Electronic
Voting, http://josephhall.org/papers/jhall-evt06.pdf (last visited Nov. 19,2008). Butcf.N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-165.7(a)(6), (d)(9) (West 2007) (requiring companies that sell voting
machines in North Carolina to make their source code available for inspection, merely upon
request, to a wide group of potentially interested individuals, including the state chairs of every
recognized political party and up to three persons designated by each party chair).
169

172

Cf. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: SUBPOENAS

AND CONTEMPT POWER 7 (2003) (noting that "legislative needs" embodied in a congressional

subpoena can override a private party's asserted "need to protect confidential trade secrets").
"13 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-525(b) (2008).
14 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.6a (West 2003).

1' See id.
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B. Timing of State-Court Actions
In Jennings v. Buchanan, the trial court did not even rule on the key discovery
request-let alone the election contest itself-until nearly two months after the election. 76 And the appellate decision on that discovery ruling, although denominated
an "expedited" proceeding, took more than five additional months. 177 Especially
where the office at stake has a term of only twenty-four months, these sorts of delays
should not be tolerated.
The goal of a state-court election contest should be to resolve the question of
which candidate is entitled to the seat before the seat is actually filled. In the case of
Congress, members typically are seated during the first week of January, following the
November general election. 7 8 Therefore, state election codes should set a general
deadline for completing discovery and trial-court proceedings in these contests by
some point in December, roughly a month after the official certification of the election
results, and well before the date on which the winning candidate is to be sworn into
office. To ensure some degree of flexibility, the deadline should take the form of a
rebuttable presumption, offering the trial judge the opportunity to file a written opinion
justifying any extension that would prevent entering the final judgment before the presumptive December deadline, for example, when discovery is proceeding expeditiously but some extra time is needed.
This approach is not unrealistically speedy. Indeed, California law requires trial
courts to decide election contests and to file findings of fact and conclusions of law
within ten days of the evidentiary hearing. 7 9 At a minimum, states should follow New
York's lead in telling trial judges to give election-contest proceedings "preference
over all other causes in all courts."'8 ° Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the election code
instructs courts to "proceed without delay" and to postpone all other business "if
necessary... to the hearing and determination of [an election] contest."''
Furthermore, as Jennings v. Buchanan amply illustrates, it is important for the
state-court appellate processes also to be expedited (and not just nominally). For
appeals in primary-election contests, California law requires the appellate court to
give "precedence over all other appeals" and to act within ten days after the appeal
is filed;8 2 the same approach could be applied to general-election contests, too.
And, at least for contests involving federal or statewide offices, states also should
176

H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 15.
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Id. at 16.

Id. at 15.
179 See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 16603 (West 2003).
180 N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 16-116 (Consol. 1986).
181 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3404 (West 2007); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-525(a),
178

(b) (2008) (requiring the judge to set a hearing within twenty days and then "to proceed
without delay" and even to "postpon[e]... all other business").
182 CAL. ELEc. CODE § 16920 (West 2003).

420

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:397

consider granting "pass-through" appellate jurisdiction, which would allow the state
supreme court to review the trial court's judgment, bypassing any ruling on the
merits from the intermediate appellate court. Illinois law provides that trial-court
findings go immediately to the state supreme court, where the parties can file
objections; the court then can accept, reject, or modify the findings, and can even
take more evidence if needed." 3
C. Relationship Between State-CourtActions and FCEA Cases
A rebuttable presumption that state trial-court proceedings will conclude in
December, followed by highly expedited review by the state supreme court, also
would alleviate the current tensions that exist between state litigation and federal
cases under the FCEA. In Jennings v. Buchanan, the House's desire to defer to the
state judiciary contributed to months of delay.'84 This desire was predicated in part
on the House Democrats' hope that the state courts would allow Jennings to undertake the necessary discovery, thus rendering a separate House investigation unnecessary, but also in part on the insistence of the House Republicans that "initiating
Committee involvement in this case prior to the full pursuit of state remedies by the
contestant [would be] premature and risky."'' 5 During this delay, Buchanan was
serving in Congress, but under a cloud. And for that entire time, Jennings's 2008
campaign was effectively on ice, as she continued to pursue victory in the mangled
2006 election. Had Jennings actually succeeded in state court after the 10th
Congress commenced in January 2007, there might well have been an additional
layer of controversy over whether the state judiciary had the power to effectively
unseat a sitting Member of Congress. That could have become a heated constitutional fight that would be best avoided.
To the extent that states adopt the sort of timing reforms suggested here, thus
ensuring full judicial review before the first day of the new Congress, the House of
Representatives could adjust its practice under the FCEA. First, the House could
have far more confidence that the correct candidate is in fact being seated. Second,
at the very beginning of the new Congress, without delay, the House Administration
Committee could empanel the three-judge task force to review the FCEA case. And
third, that panel usually would not need to await the outcome of pending state-court
litigation, since that litigation would be finished already. Therefore, it could immediately move forward with its own review of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law in the now-completed state-court case, and could also, if need be, commence its
See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.10a (West 2003).
' Letter from Vernon J. Ehlers, Ranking Member, Comm. on House Admin., to Juanita
Millender-McDonald, Chairwoman, Comm. on House Admin. (Apr. 16,2007), reprintedin
H.R. REP. No. 110-528, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 61.
183

185 Id.
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own independent investigation of the facts. The months of sitting around and waiting
that plagued the Jennings-Buchanan case would thus be circumvented.
D. Processfor Adjudicating FCEA Claims
To accomplish this reform, Congress should amend the FCEA to provide for
quicker action, at least where state-court litigation has concluded before the new
Congress convenes. As currently drafted, the FCEA simply cannot fulfill its mission
of "provid[ing] efficient, expeditious processing of the cases and a full opportunity
186
for both parties to be heard."'
Under the current FCEA, for example, the contestee has a full thirty days to file
a motion to dismiss. 187 But once that motion has been filed, the statute sets no
deadline for ruling on the motion.188 Curiously, the FCEA sets deadlines for various
parts of the process-for example, the filing of final briefs by both parties' 8g-but
other parts, such as rulings on dismissal motions, are left to the unfettered discretion
of the House Administration Committee or its three-member task force.' 9" And even
aside from those schedule gaps in the statutory scheme, if all the time periods enumerated in the statute are totaled up, it is hard to imagine any hotly contested FCEA
case taking less than six or eight months. Clearly, that is too long.
Instead, each step of the adjudication should be mapped out in the statute, with a
specific, and relatively short, deadline. As with the state election contests discussed
earlier, it probably would be wise to express most of these deadlines as rebuttable presumptions that can be extended only when justified in a written order. In amending
the FCEA, the goal should be to keep the entire proceeding short, commensurate
with the key fact (which was given such short shrift in Jennings v. Buchanan) that
House terms last only twenty-four months. 9 ' An election contest that consumes
most of those twenty-four months is nearly worthless. The goal should be to resolve
these contests in a matter of weeks, not months. After all, Congress made the FCEA
applicable to House, but not Senate, contests in part because two-year terms present
much greater urgency than six-year terms.'92 When a House seat is at stake, every
week, much less every month, really counts.
Finally, in addition to imposing a series of deadlines for each phase of an FCEA
case, Congress should reiterate that the statute calls for an adversarial process. It is
186
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ACT, H.R. REP. No. 91-

569, at 3 (1969).
187 2 U.S.C. § 383 (2006).
188 See id.
189 Id. § 392(d)-(f) (allowing up to eighty-five days for briefing-forty-five days for contestant's initial brief, thirty for contestee's answer brief, and ten for contestant's reply brief).
' See supra discussion Part I1.
191 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
'92 2 U.S.C. §§ 381-382 (2006).
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fundamentally unfair to "penalize contestants who cannot fully support their credible
allegations because the proof of their claims is in the hands or minds of those who
have committed the errors or violations at issue."' 93 In Jennings v. Buchanan, the
three-member task force strayed from that principle. The task force called on the
GAO to conduct an independent investigation, behind closed doors, and with no direct
input from the two parties, while denying Jennings's request that both sides' experts
be given access to the iVotronic hardware, software, and source code. 94 In the end,
the GAO conducted only a partial investigation that encompassed far less testing and
analysis than the parties' experts would have done. 195 And the GAO took far longer
to do it.196 It would be better, in such circumstances, to give both the contestant and
the contestee immediate access to the critical evidence, and then let the adversarial
process work its course. The two candidates for the House seat, after all, have the
greatest incentive to dig out the truth (or, presumably, at least one of them has such
an incentive). At a minimum, the parties' efforts would likely sharpen the areas of
factual disagreement; at best, they might resolve the case entirely. Even assuming,
as at least one task-force member predicted in Jenningsv. Buchanan, that the result
of an adversarial process would be an inconclusive "battle" of conflicting experts, it
would be best to allow such a battle, subject to reasonably tight time constraints, and
only thereafter bring in the GAO or some other independent investigative entity to
resolve whatever factual disputes remain.
CONCLUSION

Reaffirming the centrality of the adversarial process to resolving federal contested
elections-in combination with setting a series of precise deadlines for adjudicating
FCEA cases, establishing a tight but realistic timetable for state-court litigation, and
ensuring liberal discovery untainted by excessive protection of trade secrets-would
go a long way toward preventing repetition of the mistakes that plagued Jennings v.
Buchanan. The next time voting machines fail in a close House election and thousands of votes "disappear," these reforms would help ensure that key questions do not
go unanswered as the congressional term slips away. And perhaps these reforms will
even ensure that, next time, the candidate who attracts the most voters will actually
be allowed to represent those voters in Congress.
19'
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'94 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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